Author: Ray Shelton

Date: June 12, 1952.

Revised: June 24, 2004.


    1. The Via Moderna or the New Way (Continued).

      Another conception that influenced Luther was nomialists' concepts of God as will.

      "The nominalist stress on God as will has, according to Aulen, two implications which enter prominantly into Luther's position. One is the tendency to think of God and man's relation to him, in more personal terms than is possible when God is defined in terms of intellect. The other is the emphasis upon the sovereignty of God. These ideas belong to both nominalism and the theology of Luther...." [100]

      Luther found this same emphasis upon God as will and sovereign in Augustine. All this, no doubt, shows the influence of nominalism on Luther. But this does not mean, as some like the Roman Catholics have tried to show, that Luther was merely a disciple of one or another of the nominalist theologians.

      "An enire literature has sprung up around Luther's phrase 'my master Occam.' Some scholars have taken a cue from this phrase and have constructed elaborate parallels to show that Luther's Reformation was an extension of the work begun by William of Occam. After Reinhold Seeberg's detailed investigation of the question, it seems far more valid to hold that in the case of Occam, as in the case of St. Bernard, Luther saw the influence of the Gospel and was happy for it. The phrase does indicate that he knew Occam and probably knew him better than he did the earlier theologians. Similarly, Melanchthon tells us that Luther had practically memorized the writings of the fifteenth-century theologia Gabriel Biel." [101]

      Luther's main opposition to nominalism as to the rest of Scholasticism was concerning the plan of salvation based on merit. This involved the problem of free will. This medieval plan of salvation began with St. Augustine and was developed by the Scholastic theologians of the via antiqua and the via moderna. This medieval plan of salvation is summarized in E. G. Schwiebert's book Luther and His Times.

      "After the Fall, according to Augustine, the human race was divided into two classes: (a) the elect and (b) the lost. These members were chosen from all eternity by God according to his divine purpose. Their number was fixed and unalterable regardless of the attitude of the lost. All this had nothing to do with foreknowledge. Salvation was believed to be entirely a gift of God. God's grace was active only in the elect; it begot in the chosen the will to believe. The fate of all the unfortunate lost souls remained forever hidden in the great ultimate purpose of an all-wise God.

      "With Augustine, man was in need of preparation by God's divine saving grace. This preliminary work was done by the gratia praeveniens, the prevenient grace, which favorably disposed the soul of the elect toward God's saving purpose. After the prevenient grace had paved the way, man was changed in his inner being in that he was now ready to cooperate with God. Now the gratia co-operans, the grace of God assisting man, became active in the sinner's soul. If man accepted faith in Christ he now became fully recipient of God's saving grace. Through all this a change within man's heart had been effected which inclined it toward the good. Now began the process of man's justification.

      "....justification was a lifelong process, a gradual reparation of the soul by the inpouring of God's grace. Through Baptism there occurred a remission of original sin, but man was not justified nor certain of his salvation until the end of life. [102]

      "Peter Lombard was still an Augustinian in his conception of sin, predistination, grace, faith and justification. With Anselm, Abelard, and St. Bernard, however, he could not accept the complete impotence of the human will after the Fall, which made man a complete slave to sin. Lombard held that our will play a part in preparation for grace, but he was not willing to accept the view that grace is irresistible.

      "Bonaventura, one of the principal followers of St. Francis, stressed the symbol of light as one of God's main attributes. God's light also enlightens the human mind, making it possible for man to see things in their 'transcendental simplicity.' In this same class is also God's 'light of Grace,' through which man learns to know God. This prominent Franciscan departed even farther from Augustine in claiming that man had a certain power to do good after the Fall. 'If man does all within his power, God gives him grace,' he wrote. This first winning of God's approval he defined as the Meritum de Congruo, which meant congruous to, or in conformity with, his [man's] best inner nature. In appreciation of man's earnest effort, God now grants him Augustine's 'grace freely given.' With the help of this grace, man would be able to rise until he was ready for the second step, the Meritum de Condigno, or the merit that is sufficient for receiving Christ's save grace. With Bonaventura the absolute predestination of Augustine became dependent upon God's foreknowledge of man's future action.

      "Although St. Thomas in some respects returned to Augustine, especially with reference to irresistible grace and absolute predestination, he also realized that 'grace' would have to be harmonized with the 'free will' to leave proper place for merit in the Church. Here the influence of Aristotle, who distinguished between the soul and its faculties, became very useful. Thomas taught that the infusion of God's grace created a special new attitude which he called the 'habitus.' This newly 'informed soul' with its liberated will would now be able to act upon the faculties of the soul. The new man was able to win the Meritus de Congruo, for he was no longer a slave of sin. Thomas' conception of justification was a sinultaneous act of God's infused grace, turning man's will toward God and causing him inwardly to break away from sin. All this happens through the faith which must perfect itself with God's co-operating grace. St. Thomas' view of justification has often been likened to a soul that is inwardly sick and must be slowly healed through God's infusion of grace until it triumphs in love.

      "Duns Scotus believed that the dominant thing in this universe is 'will.' He thought that God in His ultimate being was also will. This school, of which Occam, d'Ailly and Biel were followers, again stressed the possible choices that had had in all eternity and believed that the universe, as we know it, existed because God had willed it so. Scotus claimed that man through the Fall merely lost his 'supernatural righteousness.' Fundamentally, man remained good, even though there existed in him a tendency toward evil. This natural goodness made it possible for man to love God because he had retained his free will. But on the question of predestination his major premise, that God had established all things, led to the conclusion that the matter of salvation was God's aritrary decision. According to this thesis, the historic Roman Church was also here because God had willed it thus. In this world order, man had sufficient free will to win the Meritum de Congruo, after which God would grant His 'grace freely given,' with which he could also gain the Meritum de Condigno. Therefore, in the analysis, everything depended upon man's being able to win God's approval, the acceptio Dei. Until man had proved himself worthy of the 'merit freely give,' God would not help him in his difficult upward climb. In such a doctrine of salvation, the human will was a decisive factor.

      "In William Occam, the pupil of Duns Scotus, the ideas of this new school reached their maturity. He also stessed the infinite possibilities that lay at God's disposal in all eternity. He taught that Christian faith is real only when man holds as true God's divine revelation in the Bible. This faith God pours into the human soul. He believed this view to be in harmony with the teachings of the church. But here again lay the difficulty, for it was always revelation as interpreted by the Church.

      "With reference to the doctrine of salvation, Occam also held that man can definitely prepare for God's saving grace. Since man's will is free, he is capable of doing good by himself, even to the point of achieving a real 'contritio,' or heartfelt sorrow. Thus, by his own determination, he could win the Meritum de Congruo, which would then cause God to come to his assistance and with this co-operating grace enable him to win the second step, the Meritum de Condigno. This meant that he had now reached the stage where a 'non-imputation of his sins' resulted from God's divine act of forgiveness. Only in the last part, after man had proved his worth, did the sufferings of Christ and His atonement enter into man's salvation....

      ".... Biel accepted the Occamist steps of man's role in winning God's saving grace. But in his elaboration of these, he went even further in his claims for man. He added:
      'Although Christ's suffering is the principal merit, on account of which grace is conferred, it is, nevertheless, not the sole and total meritorious cause. For it is manifest that there always concurs with the merit of Christ a certain operation of merit on the recipient of grace'*" [103]
      (* Schwiebert's footnote here reproduced in note 103 below)

      In another passage, Biel becomes more specific:

      "The human will can love God above all things through its own natural powers. The sinner is also able to remove the hindrances to grace, yea, to hate sin and to will not to sin. By the removal of the impediments and by the good step toward God made by his own free will he can acquire the merit de congruo, the first grace in turning toward God.*" [104]
      (* Author's footnote in note 104 below)

      Luther knew this passge by heart and in his lectures on Romans in 1515 and 1516 he criticizes the theologians following Biel who hold this same view.

      "They are delirious who say that man by his own power can love God above all things. O proud, O hoggish theologians!..." [105]
      This is what Nygren calls the ladder of merit. As it is clear, merit does not exclude grace, but, on the contrary it is built upon grace alone. Grace enables man to achieve the measure of holiness that makes fellowship with God. Here again we have salvation described in terms of an ascent from man to God rather than a movement from God to man. This egocentric ascent to gain holiness is eros and the theocentric movement is agape.
      "His struggles in the monastery are related to the tension between eros and agape within the idea of caritas. He tried conscientiously to follow the way of ascent and found it to be impossible. The ladder of merit had been spiritualized by Occam and Biel in such a way that the tensions within it became still more pronounced. They demanded the right inner attitude on the part of the penitent. True contrition should rest on an unselfish love for God, not upon the fear or punishment or hope of reward. It was this demand for unselfish love, agape, that sharpened Luther's problem to the point where he shattered the whole idea of caritas and supplanted it with agape. From the Roman point of view, the intention behind the act gives it religious quality and confers merit upon the doer. To evaluate one's conduct in terms of one's own interest in the outcome is clearly eros. Luther condemns this attitude on the basis that it gives an ulterior purpose to the good act. He who seeks to promote his own blessedness through the good is not completely devoted to the good itself." [106]
      The things in medieval philosophy to which Luther objected were the egocentric features. His objection to the ladder of merit is really an objection to egocentricity. Man is seeking to project himself upward to the level of God by his efforts and works. The ladder of merit aggravates egocentricity rather than eliminates it.
      "The problem of self-love does not present itself to Luther as a problem of refinement and sublimation, as is the case in Augustines's theology. On the contrary, self-love must be rooted out and destroyed. The variant interpretations of the commandment. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' are cited as an indication of their difference at this point. For Augustine the commandment involves a definite obligation to love oneself. Luther interprets it to mean that the pattern for an equally spontaneous love for the neighbor. Therefore, the commandment involves a condemnation of self-love. Love for one's neighbor is dispossess and annihilate self-love. Luther knows of no justifiable self-love. Selfishness is the very essence of sin. The difference between Luther and Augustine at this point may also be indicated by the contrasting interpretations that they give to the term incurvatus. Both use it extensively. Augustine uses it to describe the earthward bent of man's affections. Luther uses it to describe the affection are bent in upon himself. Sin does not consist in man's attempt to gain his ends in ways that do not satisfy, but in the fact that he seeks to gain his ends, not God's end." [107]

      Luther's concept of love is clearly set forth in the twenty-eighth thesis of the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518. Although Luther does not use the terms eros and agape, this passage clearly seems to distinguish between eros and agape. There Luther says,

      "The love of God does not find but creates its lovable object; man's love is caused by its lovable object." [108]
      In support of the second clause, Luther points to general agreement among "all philosophers and theologians." In support of the first clause, he points to Christ's love for sinners according to His own statement of His mission: "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners." The radical thing about Luther's treatment of love is that he allows it to be defined by God's love instead by man's. [109]

      Thus it is that Luther took the two emphases of nominalism on the will and the sovereignty of God and used them in a radically different way.

      "Nominalism finds in them support for moralism and authoritarianism. Will is the essential fact about man as it is the essential fact about God. Man discharges his duty only in the strenuous exercise of his will. The nominalists criticized the concept of grace found in Aquinas on the grounds that it tends to weaken the sense of personal obligation and the necessity of human effort. Because God's will is completely sovereign, it cannot be apprehended by reason; it is known only by revelation. This comes only through the Church. Nominalism, consequently, pits the authority of the Church against the authority of reason. Luther uses the two ideas in an entirely different way. The personal character of the relationship to God excludes every element of legalism. God does not confront man through law governing his external conduct, but he lays a claim upon the inner man which cannot he satisfied by conforming to particular laws. The fellowship which he brings about is an immediate and intimate fellowship of personalities. Grace is God's attitude toward man as a total person. The emphasis upon will does not lead to moralism in Luther, as it does in nominalism. Neither does the emphasis upon the sovereignty of God. On the contrary, it makes every human effort seem irrelevant. Instead of being at odds with the concept of Grace, as in nominalism, it reinforces that concept. God's sovereignty becomes the basis for sola gratia." [110]

      Luther also attacked the teaching of nominalism as well as the rest of Scholastism concerning free will. Here he draws upon Augustine's teaching and no doubt this accounts for his delight with Augustine although they were not in agreement on all points. Luther makes some statements in his lectures on Romans (1515-1516) which are very much like Augustine. Man's salvation depends upon God's choice.

      "God commands that the elect shall be saved and that those who are desined for hell shall be entangled in evil in order that he may show forth his mercy and also his anger...." [111]

      It is interesting to note how Luther took the sharpness out of this stern doctrine. In the same lectures he says:

      "To them who love God, with filial love, which is not of nature but only of the Holy Spirit -- to them these words (Rom. ix, 3) are most excellent. They submit themselves to the whole will of God, even to hell and external damnation, if God should want that. However, if they wholly conform to the will of God, it is impossible that they should remain in hell." [112]
      In the theses, defended by Bernhardi on Septmeber 25, 1516, under Luther's presidency, the possibility of a man's fulfiling God's commands by his free will without grace is denied.[113] In the letter to John Lang in the middle of October, 1516, Luther calls Biel a Pelagian.[114] In another letter to Lang dated March 1, 1517, Luther seems aware of the difference between himself and Erasmus on this subject.
      "But the opinion of him who attributes something to man's will is far different from the opinion of him who knows nothing but grace. I much prefer to conceal this opinion for fear of confirming the enemies of Erasmus; the Lord will perchance give him understanding in his own time." [115]

      Free will was to become the subject of great debate betweem Erasmus and Luther in 1525-1526. The great volume Bondage of the Will came out of the debate. In the disputation of Francis Gunther on September 4, 1517, Augustine's teaching on free will and grace were used to disprove the views of Scotus, Occam, d'Ailly and Biel. The Scholastics were arraigned as false teachers holding views based on the heretic of Augustine's day, Pelagius. A few of the ninety-nine theses concerned with free will are as follows:

      "It is true that man, who is become 'a bad tree,' can but will and do what is evil."

      "It is false that the will, left to itself, can do good as well as evil; for it is not free, but led captive."

      "It is not in the power of man's will to purpose or not purpose all that is suggested to him."

      "Man, by nature, cannot wish that God should be God. He would prefer that himself should be God, and that God should not be God."

      "The excellent, infallible, and sole preparation for Grace is the election and the everlasting predestination of God."

      "It is false to any, that man, if he does all in his power, dissipates the obstacles to divine grace."

      "In one word, nature possesses neither a pure reason nor a good will."

      "On man's part, there is nothing that goes before grace -- nothing but impotency and rebellion."

      "There is not moral virtue without pride or sadness, -- that is to say, without sin."

      "From first to last, we are not the masters of our actions but their slaves."

      "We do not become righteous by doing that which is righteous;
      but having become righteous, we do that which is righteous." [116]

      Again in the Heidelberg disputation of 1518 Luther attacked free will. The thirteenth thesis said:

      "Since the fall, free will is a mere name; when the will does what is in its power it sins mortally." [117]


    Thus it was that Luther opposed Scholasticism. Luther fairly well summarizes his attitude to Scholasticism in the last paragraph of a letter to John Sylvius at Zwichau on March 24, 1518.

    "I vow there is hardly an theologian or scholastic, especially at Leipsic, who understands one chapter of the Bible, or even one chapter of Aristotle's philosophy, which I hope to prove triumphantly if they give me a chance. onning over the words of the Gospel is not understanding it. Wherefore flee not before the face of ignorance, and forget this clamor of doctors, universities and professors, for they are specters, not men, but apparitions, which you would not fear if you could see them clearly." [118]
    But this is not to be taken to mean that Luther condemned blindly all that was in the Scholastics. In a letter to John Staupitz on March 31, 1518, he argues for himself the right to reject or accept what he sees in the Scholastic's writings. Thus he says he is not like his adversaries who blindly accept all.
    "My adversaries excite hatred against me from the scholastic doctors, because I prefer the Fathers and the Bible to them; they are almost insane with their zeal. I read the scholastics with judgment, not, as they do, with closed eyes. Thus the apostle commanded: 'Prove all things; hold to that which is good.' I neither reject all that they say nor approve all. Thus those babblers make the whole of a part, a fire of a spark and an elephant of a fly. But with God's help I care nothing for their scarescrows. They are words; they will remain words. If Duns Scotus, Gabriel Biel and others had the right to dissent from Aquinas, and if the Thomists have the right to contradict everybody, so that there are as many sects among the schoolmen as there are heads or as hairs on each head, why should they not allow me the same right against them as they use against each other?" [119]

    Luther considered the Scholastics' views as opinions without authority and that it was his duty as a teacher to oppose error. Thus he writes to Jerome Scultetus, Bishop of Brandenburg, on May 22, 1518:

    "Moreover, it is established that we owe no allegiance to the scholastics and canonists, when they only give their own opinions, for if it is commonly said to be base for a lawyer to speak without authority, it is surely baser for a theologian to do so, and by authority I mean not Aristotle (for they give his authority far too readily), but the Bible, the Canons and the Fathers. Furthermore, I thought that it because my profession and office to call in question such matters which are both very doubtful and if false very dangerous, for during centuries no Christian has doubted that the schools have the right to debate even the most sacred and awful matters...." [120]

    This attack on Scholasticism stems from Luther's view of faith and reason. Human reason is to be subject to faith and attempts to establish and defend God or Bible is futile.

    "Therefore the attempt to establish or defend divine order with human reason, unless that reason has previously been establish and enlightened by faith, is just as futile as if I would throw light upon the sun with a lightless lantern, or rest a rock upon a reed. For Isaiah vii makes reason subject to faith, when it says: 'Except ye believe, ye shall not have understanding or reason.' It does not say, 'Except ye have reason, ye shall not believe...."

    "The wise man says of the wisdom of God: 'Wisdom hath overcome the proud with her power.' It is most deplorable that we should attempt with our reason to defend God's Word, whereas the Word of God is rather our defence against all our enemies, as St. Paul teaches us. Would he not be a great fool who in the thick of battle sought to protect his helmet and sword with bare hand and unshielded head? It is no different when we essay, with our reason, to defend God's law, which should rather be our weapon." [121]

    Reason and understanding are not to be destroyed but are instruments to be used by faith. A question about this was asked in the Table-Talks.
    "Why do Christians make use of their natural wisdom and understanding, seeing it must be set aside in matters of faith, as not only not understanding them, but also as striving against them?"
    (The person who asked this question betrays the nominalist's distinction between faith and reason. Luther thus in this answer overthrow that distinction.) Luther replies:
    "The natural wisdom of a human creature in matters of faith, until he be regenerate and born anew, is altogether darkness, knowing nothing in divine cases. But in a faithful person, regenerate and enlightened by the Holy Spirit, through the Word, it is a fair and glorious instrument, and work of God: for even as alll God's gifts, natural instruments, and expert faculties, are hurtful to the ungodly, even so are they wholesome and saving to the good and godly."

    "The understanding, through faith, receives life from faith; that which was dead, is made alive again; like as our bodies, in light day, when it is clear and bright, are better disposed, rise, move, walk, etc., more readily and safely than they do in the dark night, so it is with human reason, which strives not against faith, when enlightened, but rather further and advances it." [122]

    Thus humand reason, that is unsaved reason, is not in order in divine things.

    "When it comes to the knowledge of how one may stand before God and attain to eternal life, that is truly not to be achieved by our work or power, nor to originate in our brain. In other things, those pertaining to this temporal life, you may glory in what you know, you may advance the teachings of reason, you may invent ideas of your own; for example: how to make shoes or clothes, how to govern a household, how to manage a herd. In such things exercise your mind to the best of your ability. Cloth or leather of this sort will permit itself to stretched and cut according to the good pleasure of the tailor or shoemaker. But in spiritual matters, human reasoning certainly is not in order; other intelligence, other skill and power, are requisite here -- sonething to be granted by God himself and revealed through his Word."

    "What mortal has ever discovered or fathomed the truth that the three persons in the eternal divine essence are one God; that the second person, the Son of God, was obliged to become man, born of a virgin; and that no way of life could be opened for us, save through his crucifixion? Such truth never would have been heard nor preached, would never in all eternity have been published, learned and believed, had not God himself revealed it." [123]

    Thus it is God's revelation of Himself through the Word that ultimately overthrows Aristotle and the synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle of the Scholastics. Let us look a little closer at Luther's concept of the Word.

    "You ask, 'What then is this Word of God, and how shall it be used, since there are so many words of God?' I answer, The Apostle explains that in Romans 1. The Word is the Gospel of God concerning His Son, Who was made flesh, suffered, rose from the dead, and was glorified through the Spirit Who sanctifies. For to preach Christ means to feed the soul, to make it righteous, to set it free and to save it, if it believes the preaching. For faith alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of God." [124]

    In another passage he discusses the gospel.

    "It must be understood that all the Apostles present one and the same doctrine; and it is not correct to speak of four Evangelists and four Gospels for all which the Apostles wrote is one Gospel. But Gospel means nothing but a proclamation and heralding of the grace and mercy of God through Jesus Christ, merited, and procured through his death. And it is not properly that which is contained in books, and is comprehended in the latter, but rather an oral proclamation and Living word, and a voice which echoes through the whole world, and is publicly uttered that it may universally be heard. Neither is it a book of laws, containing in itself many excellent doctrines, as has hitherto been held. For it does not bid us do works whereby we may become righteous, but proclaims to us the grace of God, bestowed freely, and apart from any merit of our own; and it tells how Christ has taken our place, and rendered satisfaction for our sins, and canceled them, and by His own works justifies and saves us.

    Whoever set forth this, by preaching or writing, he teaches the true Gospel, an all the Apostle did, especially St. Paul and St. Peter, in their Epistles. So that all, whatever it be, that sets forth Christ is one and the same Gospel, although one may use a different method, and speak of it in different language from another, for it may perhaps be a brief or extended address, or a brief or extended writing. But yet, if it tends to this point, that Christ is our Saviour, and we through faith on Him, apart from works of our own, are justified and saved, it is still the same Word, and but one Gospel, just as there is also but one faith and one baptism in the whole Christian world." [125]

    Thus the Word of God is the message of God about Christ contained in Scripture. It is as though a voice had spoken it, the voice of God. Thus one becomes certain.

    "How can we know what is God's Word, and what is right and wrong?...
    You must determine this matter yourself, for your very life depends upon it. Therefore God must speak to your heart: This is God's Word; otherwise you are undecided.... And God commands this Word to be told you through men, and especially has he permitted it to be proclaimed and written for you by the Apostles; for St. Peter and St. Paul do not preach their own word, but God's Word, as Paul himself testifies in I Thess. 2:15: 'When ye receive the Word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the Word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe.' Surely, a person can preach the Word to me, but no one is able to put it into my heart except God alone, who must speak to the heart, or all is vain; for when he is silent, the Word is not spoken. Hence no one shall draw me from the Word which God teaches me."

    "Of this I must be as certain as two and three make five...." [126]

    Here is the epistemological principle that brought reform to the Church and philosophy. Today we have not the same situation that Martin Luther faced, that is, an international Church corrupted by power, money and pagan philosophy. But we rather face the end product of that medieval synthesis between pagan and Christian thought.

    "....the great Thomistic synthesis of the thirteenth century, had stated the Biblical view in a self-defeating way. The Thomistic synthesis of science, philosophy and theology involved such an obscuring of the inner genius of Christianity that sooner or later the revelational view must lose its hold -- not by any inner necessity of Biblical theism, but simply because the inner spirit of that view had not been properly grasped by the scholastics." [127]

    The Reformation checked and protested this synthesis.

    "The Protestant Reformation was, on its theological side, in part, a protest against the manner in which medieval Catholicism had formulated the Christian answer to the problem of religious knowledge. While the great reformers, to religious epistemology, they were unsparing in their contention -- shared at points before them by scholastics like Duns Scotus -- that Christianity was presented to the modern world in the most unsatisfactory and self-defeating terms by the Thomistic relation of reason and faith." [128]

    But Scholasticism was not checked for long. Almost immediately another scholasticism, Protestant scholasticism, began to compromise and obscure the theology set forth by Luther. It led to rationalism and eventually to the world situation today. This was not because of the weakness of the truth but only in the way it was presented. We need again the Reformation epistemological principle, its implications for philosophy, theology and life.


[100] Carson, p. 153.

[101] Pelikan, p. 6.

[102] Schwiebert, pp. 157-160.

[103] Schwiebert, pp. 167-169.
[* Loofs, Leitfaden, p. 615.
Trans. by Mackinnon in Martin Luther, I, pp. 75-76.]

[104] Schwiebert, p. 169.
[* Mackinnon, Martin Luther, I, p. n.1, for free rendition by author.]

[105] Hyma, p. 110.

[106] Carson, p. 83.

[107] Carson, p. 85.

[108] Carson, p. 86.

[109] Carson, p. 86.

[110] Carson, pp. 153-154.

[111] Hyma, p. 213.

[112] Hyma, p. 213.

[113] Smith, p. 41, n.4.

[114] Smith, p. 42.

[115] Smith, p. 55.

[116] d'Aubigne, p. 201.

[117] Smith, p. 83.

[118] Smith, p. 77.

[119] Smith, p. 78.

[120] Smith, p. 80.

[121] Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr. (ed.),
A Compend of Luther's Theology.
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943), p. 4.

[122] Kerr, pp. 4-5.

[123] Kerr, p. 3.

[124] Kerr, p. 11.

[125] Kerr, pp. 9-10.

[126] Kerr, pp. 11-12.

[127] Carl F. H. Henry, The Drift of Western Thought.
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 34-35.

[128] Henry, p. 35.


Edgar M. Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1948.

J. H. Merle d'Aubigne,
History of the Great Reformation. Vol. I & II, 15th ed.;
New York: Robert Carter; Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.

Robert Herndon Fife,
Young Luther, The Intellectual and Religious Development of Martin Luther to 1518.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.

Carl F. H. Henry, The Drift of Western Thought.
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1928.

Albert Hyma, Luther's Theological Development from Erfurt to Augsburg.
New York: F. S. Crofts & Company, 1928.

Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr. (ed.), A Compend of Luther's Theology.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943.

James Mackinnon, The Origin of the Reformation.
St. Louis: Concordia, Green and Company, 1939.

Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard.
St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950.

Dagobert D. Runes (ed.) The Dictionary of Philosophy.
"Scholasticism," by Hunter Guthrie.
New York: Philosophical Library.

Ernest George Schwiebert, Luther and His Times.
St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950.

Preserved Smith (trans. and ed.),
Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters.
Vol. I (1507-1521),
Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1913.

Works of Martin Luther. Vols. I & II,
Philadelphia: A. J. Holman Company, 1915.